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Abstract—This work addresses classification of unknown bi-
naries executed in sandbox by modeling their interaction with
system resources (files, mutexes, registry keys and communication
with servers over the network) and error messages provided by
the operating system, using vocabulary-based method from the
multiple instance learning paradigm. It introduces similarities
suitable for individual resource types that combined with an
approximative clustering method efficiently group the system
resources and define features directly from data. This approach
effectively removes randomization often employed by malware
authors and projects samples into low-dimensional feature space
suitable for common classifiers. An extensive comparison to the
state of the art on a large corpus of binaries demonstrates
that the proposed solution achieves superior results using only
a fraction of training samples. Moreover, it makes use of a
source of information different than most of the prior art, which
increases the diversity of tools detecting the malware, hence
making detection evasion more difficult.
Index Terms—Malware, dynamic analysis, sandboxing, multi-
ple instance learning, classification, random forest.
I. MOTIVATION
Since malware is presently one of the most serious threats
to computer security with the number of new samples reaching
140 million in 2015 [3], battles against it are fought on many
fronts. Signature matching remains the core defense technol-
ogy, but due to evasion techniques such as polymorphism,
obfuscation, and encryption, keeping good recall is difficult for
static analysis and methods based purely on string matching.
A popular approach to tackle these problems is to execute a
binary in a controlled environment (sandbox) [35], monitor its
behavior, and based on this behavior classify the sample into
benign or malware class (or as a particular malware family).
The assumption of these dynamic analysis methods is that
behavior should be more difficult to randomize and therefore
it should constitute a more robust signal.
Most approaches to dynamic analysis rely on system
calls [32], [1], [45], as they are the only means how the binary
can interact with the operating system and other resources.
This popularity has however already triggered many evasion
techniques, such as shadow attacks [29], system-call injection
attacks [22], or sandbox detection [16].
A perpendicular approach to modeling system calls is to
model resources the binary has interacted with together with
the type of the resources. The rationale is that if malware wants
to provide revenue to its owner, it has to perform actions,
such as downloading advertisements in the case of adware,
encrypting hard drive in the case of ransomware, exfiltrating
sensitive data in the case of credential stealers, etc. This work
assumes that execution of these actions involves interactions
with resources visible at the operating system level, and this
interaction can be viewed as a signal which is hard to hide
and which can be indicative of malware families.
Modeling interactions with system resources has been al-
ready exploited by the prior art. Mohaisen et al. [30] extracts
a manually predefined set of features such as number of files
created in specific folders, number of HTTP requests, etc.,
and use it in supervised classification. However, we believe
that the rapidly changing threat landscape makes it difficult to
manually design features that are indicative while also being
stable over time. An alternative paradigm is to avoid manual
design and to use a bag-of-words model (BoW model), where
every interaction with a particular resource identified by its
name is considered as a unique feature [38]. The price paid
for circumventing manual feature design using BoW is an
explosion of the problem dimension, which can easily reach
millions.
This work circumvents the problem of manually designing
features while at the same time avoiding the problem dimen-
sion explosion. The approach is to first cluster resource names
with similarity functions tailored for each resource type (file
names, mutexes, registry names, and domain names), and then
use this clustering to represent a sample (a binary executed
in the sandbox) in a lower-dimensional space. This enables
us to use a random forest classifier (or any other classifier
of choice) to separate malware from legitimate samples. The
clustering also effectively removes randomization used to
evade detection.
The proposed approach is extensively evaluated on a large
number of samples (more than 200 000) and compared to
relevant prior art. Experimental results show that the proposed
approach indeed improves the accuracy of detecting malware
binaries.
The contributions of this paper are manifold including
a novel approach to representing malware using raw data,
definition of a similarity measure reflecting directory structure,
optimization of similarity function over binaries, improve-
ments to Louvain clustering in order to scale to large scale
datasets, and finally evaluation and comparison to state-of-
the-art approaches on real-world malware using large-scale
dataset.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF SANDBOXED SAMPLES
To capture the malware behavior, this work assumes that
execution of malware’s actions involves interactions with
resources visible at the operating system level. Examples of
such interactions include operations with files during encryp-
tion of a victim’s hard drive, network communication during
2data exfiltration or displaying advertisements, operation with
mutexes used to ensure a single instance of malware is running,
or manipulation with registry keys to ensure persistency after
reboot. An additional source of information are error messages
of the operating system itself. Such information is provided by
the sandboxing environment as the following warnings: dll not
found indicating missing dynamic library, incorrect executable
checksum indicating corrupted binary, and sample did not
execute indicating the fact that the binary was not executed
at all due to various reasons (corrupted binary, sandbox was
not able to copy the binary into VM, etc).
To model the interactions of a malware binary with re-
sources, this work views each binary executed in a sandbox
as a set of pairs of names and types of resources the binary
interacted with. This view frames the problem as a multiple
instance learning (MIL) problem where each sample (binary)
consists of a set of instances of different size. In our scenario
an instance represents the pair of name and type of a resource
the binary interacted with during sandboxing.
Algorithm 1 High-level overview of training (function
TRAIN) and classification (function PREDICT) of malware
samples.
1: function TRAIN(S, y) ⊲ Training samples and labels
2: I ← extractInstances(S)
3: C ← cluster(I) ⊲ Clustering of instances
(separately for individual
types)
4: X ← project(S,C) ⊲ Projection of samples into
binary vector (Alg. 2)
5: M← trainClassifier(X, y)
6: return M, C ⊲ Returns cluster centers C
and trained classifier M
7: end function
8: function PREDICT(S′, C,M)⊲ Testing samples S′, clus-
ters C and classifier M
9: X ′ ← project(S′, C) ⊲ Projection of samples into
binary vector (Alg. 2)
10: yˆ ← predict(M, X ′) ⊲ Classification of testing
samples
11: return yˆ
12: end function
Variable sizes of samples and lack of order over their
instances pose a challenge to traditional machine learning
methods that expect samples to have fixed size. A recent
review of MIL algorithms [2] lists various approaches to
overcome this variability in sample sizes. One of the most pop-
ular (also adopted in this work) is vocabulary-based method
outlined in Algorithm 1. It employs clustering of instances to
describe the sample by a fixed-dimensional vector with length
equal to the size of vocabulary, i.e. a set of clusters, so that
an ordinary machine learning method can be applied.
To convert a sample into a fixed-dimensional vector, all
instances I from all training samples S are extracted and
clustered by a suitable method per given resource type–files,
mutexes, registry keys, network communication. Note that
warnings generated by the sandboxing environment are used
Algorithm 2 Projection of samples S into binary vector using
cluster centers C.
1: function PROJECT(S,C) ⊲ Samples S and clusters C.
2: X ← ∅
3: for all s ∈ S do
4: I ← extractInstances(s)
5: x← ~0
6: for all i ∈ I do
7: c∗ ← nnSearch(i, C) ⊲ Finds closest center
c∗ to instance i.
8: x[c∗]← 1
9: end for
10: X ← X ∪ {x}
11: end for
12: return X
13: end function
Binary 1 Binary 2
\Temp\4ffdd6ab-8020\config.dmc \Temp\ed8a9718-c7a0\config.dmc
\Temp\4ffdd6ab-8020\bin.dmc \Temp\ed8a9718-c7a0\bin.dmc
\Windows\System32\ftp.exe \Windows\System32\netsh.exe
(a) raw filenames
Binary 1 Binary 2
Artifact cluster 1 Artifact cluster 1
Artifact cluster 1 Artifact cluster 1
Artifact cluster 2 Artifact cluster 2
(b) artifact clusters
Table I: Example of clustering files of two binaries from the
same family executed in the sandbox.
directly, i.e. every warning is considered as a separated cluster.
The resulting clusters represent the vocabulary. Next, for every
instance i the closest cluster prototype c∗ (a small random
subset of the cluster of instances) of corresponding type is
located. Finally, the binary representation is then used such
that element of the vector equals to 1 iff there was an instance
close to the particular cluster prototype. Once all samples are
encoded as fixed-dimensional vectors, one can use a machine
learning algorithm of choice to implement the classifier. This
work uses the random forest classifier [8] due to its versatility,
accuracy, and scalability, which make it a popular choice
for many different machine learning tasks including malware
classification [17].
Since the clustering is an essential component of the above
algorithm, the definition of similarity over instances (resource
names) greatly influences the accuracy of the system, and
therefore it should reflect properties of the application domain.
The rest of this section defines a specific similarity metric for
each type of resources the malware interact with, namely on
files, mutexes, network hostnames, and registry keys, and also
justifies our choice of the clustering method.
A. Similarity between file paths
Although viewing file paths as strings would allow
to use vast prior art such as Levenshtein distance [25],
3Hamming distance, Jaro-Winkler distance [33], or string
kernels introduced in [28], the file systems were designed
as tree structures with names of some folders (fragments
of the path) being imposed by the operating system and
the distance should reflect that. For example two files with
paths /Documents and Settings/Admin/Start
Menu/Programs/Startup/tii9fwliiv.lnk
and /Documents and Settings/Admin/Start
Menu/Programs/Accessories/Notepad.lnk share
large parts of their paths and common string similarities will
return high similarity score, but they serve very different
purposes, since the first file is a link to an application executed
after the start of the operating system (OS), while the second
is a regular link in the Start menu in Windows OS. Another
aspect that prohibits the use of common string similarities is
their computational complexity (typically O(n2) where n is
the length of the string). The complexity combined with the
number of resources to be clustered (in order of millions)
leads to unfeasible time requirements. This motivates the
design of a similarity that is fast and takes into the account
the tree structure of the file system, special folders, and
differences between folders and filenames.
The proposed similarity s(x, x′) of two file paths x and x′
is defined as
s(x, x′) = exp
(
−wT f(x, x′)
)
, (1)
where w is a vector of weights and f(x, x′) is a function
extracting a feature vector from file paths x and x′. Both the
weight vector w and function f play an essential role and are
both discussed in detail below.
The function f in (1) captures differences between the two
paths x and x′ by a fixed-dimensional vector. It first splits both
paths x and x′ into fragments xi and x′i using OS specific path
separator1, in the cases of MacOS and Windows changes all
characters to lowercase, and assigns all fragments into one of
the following four categories:
1) known folder – fragment xi is a well known folder in
the list of folders imposed by the operation system (e.g.
Windows, Program Files, System32, etc.),
2) general folder – fragment xi is a not-well-known folder
(e.g. unknown folders in Program Files, randomly
generated folders in Internet Explorer cache folder, etc.),
3) file – fragment xi is file,
4) empty – artificial fragment used for padding the paths
in cases when paths x and x′ have different depths.
When all fragments are assigned to one of the above classes,
their dissimilarity is captured by the function f as
f(x, x′) = (fKK , fKG, fKF , fKE, fGG, fGF , fGE, fFF , fFE)
where
• fKK is the number of fragments on the same level that
were both classified as known folder and were not equal,
• fGG is the sum of Levenshtein distances between all
fragments on the same level that were classified as
general folder,
1Unixes and MacOS uses ’/’ as a path separator, Windows uses ’\’.
• fFF is the sum of Levenshtein distances of all fragments
on the same level that were classified as file,
• fKG, fKF , fKE , fGF , fGE , fFE are the sums of all
fragments of the same level and were classified as known
and general folder, known folder and file, known folder
and empty, general folder and file, general folder and
empty, and file and empty respectively.
To illustrate the calculation of f(x, x′), let’s consider the same
two paths used above. At first, function f splits both paths
into fragments and assign them into one of four categories
(see Table II). Assigning fragment to classes requires a list of
known folders2, which for the purpose of this example we
assume to contain Documents and Settings, Start
Menu, Programs and Startup, which are present in all
windows installations. All corresponding folders from those
two paths are therefore assigned to known folder class, while
Admin and Accessories are labeled as general folders.3
Individual elements of the vector f(x, x′) are calculated using
the above rules as follows: the first rule applies to three
fragments 1, 3, and 4 belonging to known folder class, but
as they are all equal fKK = 0; the second rule returns 0
based on analogous reasoning but for general folders; the
third rule returns fFF = 0.7143, which is the Levenshtein
distance between tii9fwliiv.lnk and Notepad.lnk;
the only mismatch is on fragment 5–known folder and general
folder yielding fKG = 1; and finally all remaining elements
of feature vector are 0. The output of f(x, x′) is captured by
the feature vector
f(x, x′) = (0, 0, 0.7143, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
The weight vector w in (1) captures the contribution of
individual elements of the feature vector f(x, x′). Impos-
ing condition w ≥ 0, in combination with construction of
function f , bounds the value of the similarity function (1)
s(x, x′) ∈ [0, 1] such that the similarity functions returns 1
(or values close to 1) if x and x′ belong to the same class
(files in /temp/ directory, cache of the Internet Explorer,
files in system directory, etc.) and values approaching 0 if they
belong to different classes. Since the similarity function (1)
was inspired by the popular Gaussian kernel, the parameter
vector w was optimized using the Centered Kernel Target
Alignment [10] (CKTA), which is a method to optimize kernel
parameters. CKTA assumes training data {(xi, yi), }mi=1 where
xi is a file path and yi is the class of the path xi, and defines
centered kernel matrix as
[Swc ]ij = S
w
ij −
1
m
m∑
i=1
S
w
ij −
1
m
m∑
j=1
S
w
ij +
1
m2
m∑
i,j=1
S
w
ij , (2)
2Full list of known folders is available online:
https://github.com/SfinxCZ/Malware-analysis-using-multiple-instance-
learning
3The first three known folders are embedded in the functionality of the
Windows OS. The Startup folder has a specific meaning altering the
behavior of the operation system since all programs listed in this folder are
executed after the boot of the OS. On the other hand Accessories can be
easily changed without major consequences.
4Fragment 1 Fragment 2 Fragment 3 Fragment 4 Fragment 5 Fragment 6
x Documents and Settings (K) Admin (G) Start Menu (K) Programs (K) Startup (K) tii9fwliiv.lnk (F )
x′ Documents and Settings (K) Admin (G) Start Menu (K) Programs (K) Accessories (G) Notepad.lnk (F )
Table II: Example of two paths x and x′ separated into individual fragments with labels (K – known folder, G – general folder
and F – file).
where Swij = sw(xi, xj) is the kernel matrix corresponding
to the similarity function (1) parametrized by the weight
vector w. CKTA maximizes correlation between labels and
a similarity matrix by solving the following optimization
problem
w∗ = argmax
w≥0
〈Swc ,Yc〉F
‖Swc ‖F · ‖Yc‖F
, (3)
where Y is target label kernel with [Y]ij equals to 1 when
ith and j th paths from training data belongs to the same class
and −1 otherwise, 〈·, ·〉F is Frobenius product and ‖·‖F is
Frobenius norm (see Appendix A for more details). In below
experiments (3) is solved by stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
algorithm [6]. Note that although the path similarity s(xi, xj)
is not a valid kernel because it is not positive definite, the
use of centered kernel alignment is still possible as the only
limitation is that the global optimum might not be found.
To finish the example, the similarity function (1) with
weight vector w = (2, 10−5, 1, 2.3, 1.6, 1, 0.36, 0.7, 0.9) re-
turns the value s(x, x′) = 0.049, which correctly indicates
that the two paths are different.
B. Similarity of network traffic
To define the similarity between network resources one has
to overcome the randomization often employed by malware
authors that render trivial similarity based on names of network
resources (domains, IPs) ineffective. To escape blacklisting
command and control (C&C) channels of malware, its authors
use various techniques to hide and obscure C&C operation.
Popular approaches include randomization of domain names
by generating them randomly (DGA), quickly changing host-
ing servers and / or domain names by fast flux, or using large
hosting providers like Amazon Web Services to hide among
legitimate servers, etc. These techniques are relatively cheap
(e.g. registering a new .com domain costs ~3USD per 1 year)
and they allow for variation in domain names without updating
disseminated malware binaries. In contrast, switching from
one C&C paradigm to another requires such an update and
therefore occurs relatively infrequently. These two properties
contribute to each malware family using specific patterns of
domain names, paths, and parts of URLs. Exploiting these
patterns allows to group domain names into clusters. In this
work the similarity in network traffic is defined only for
HTTP/HTTPS protocol, because it is presently the default
choice for malware authors as it is rarely filtered. The ex-
tension to other network traffic is possible [23].
The similarity in URL patterns used in this work has been
adopted from [21], which has proposed to cluster domain
names so that each cluster contains domains of one type / for
one family of malware. The calculation of similarity starts by
grouping all HTTP/HTTPS requests using the domain names.
Then the model of each domain name is built from path and
query strings, transferred bytes, duration of requests and inter-
arrival times (time spans between requests to the same domain)
of individual requests to it. Finally, these models are used to
calculate the similarity function between two domain names
in the clustering. Since the calculation of the similarity is out
of scope, we refer to an original publication [21] for details.
C. Similarity between mutex names
Mutex (Mutual exclusive object) is a service provided by
most modern operating systems to synchronize multi-threaded
and multi-processes applications. This mechanism is popular
among malware authors to prevent multiple infections of the
same machine, because running two instances of the same
malware can cause conflicts limiting the potential revenue.
Mutexes are identified by their name, which can be an arbitrary
string. The naming scheme is challenging for malware authors,
because the names cannot be static, which would make them
good indicators of compromise of a particular malware, but
they cannot be completely random either, because two inde-
pendent binaries of the same family would not be able to check
the presence of each other. Therefore malware authors resorted
to pseudo-deterministic algorithms or patterns for generating
mutex names. For some malware families these patterns are
already well known, for example Sality [43] uses mutex
names of the form "<process name>.exeM_<process
ID>_"-explorer.exeM_1423_.
Since operating systems do not impose any restrictions on
the names of mutexes, they can be arbitrary strings. There-
fore standard string similarities such as Levenshtein distance,
Hamming distance, Jaro-Winkler distance, etc. can be used. In
experiments presented in Sections III Levenshtein was used,
as it gives overall good results.
D. Similarity between registry names
In Microsoft Windows operating system, the primary
target of the majority of malware, registry serves as a place
where programs can store various configuration data. It is a
replacement of configuration files with several improvements
such as strongly typed values, faster parsing, ability to store
binary data, etc. The registry is a key-value store, where key
names have the structure of a file system. The root keys
are HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT,
HKEY_USERS and HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA; some
root keys also always have sub-keys with specific names
(Software, Microsoft, Windows, etc.). Due to similarity
with a file system, the similarity distance is the same as the
one defined in Subsection II-A, but with a different set of
5names of known folders and a weight vector optimized on
registry data rather than on files.
E. Clustering of resource names
The above similarities are not true distances, which limits
the choice of applicable clustering methods to those that do not
require proper distance metric between points. The Louvain
method [7] is a popular choice and it is used in experiments
below, because it also automatically determines the number of
clusters and thus removes the need to set it manually. The use
of the Louvain method is the authors’ preference, but other
clustering methods can be used as well; the reader is referred
to [15] for an overview of methods requiring only similarity.
Algorithm 3 Approximative clustering algorithm for instances
I (resource names).
1: function APPROXCLUSTER(I; k,m, ǫ)
2: C = ∅
3: while I 6= ∅ do
4: I ′ ← Random subset of size k from I
5: C′ ← cluster(I ′,m) ⊲ Cluster instances I ′
and create cluster
prot. of size m.
6: for all i ∈ I \ I ′ do
7: c∗ ← nnSearch(i, C′) ⊲ Find cluster prot. c∗
closest to instance i.
8: if s(i, c∗) > ǫ then
9: c∗ ← c∗ ∪ {i}
10: end if
11: end for
12: C ← C ∪ C′
13: end while
14: return C
15: end function
The use of the Louvain method is not straightforward in the
scenario of this paper because it requires a full adjacency ma-
trix in advance. This results in a lower bound to computational
complexity being O(n2) in the number of resources, which is
clearly prohibitive as the number of unique resource names
to cluster can easily reach the order of millions. To decrease
the number of calculated similarities, an approach inspired
by [46], [47], [20] is adopted where the Louvain clustering is
used iteratively as summarized in Algorithm 3. Given a set of
instances I of a particular type, in every iteration the algorithm
selects a random subset I ′ ⊂ I of the data of size k small
enough for the Louvain method to be computationally feasible.
The results of the Louvaine clustering are then transformed
to cluster prototypes—random subsets of clusters with size
limited to m. Remaining data I\I ′ are then traversed and all
samples with similarity larger than ǫ to some cluster prototype
c∗ ∈ C′ are added to c∗ and removed from I. Finally, C′
is merged with the clustering C obtained in the previous
iteration, and if I is not empty, the process is repeated.
Clearly the algorithm is an approximation of a clustering
with complete data and its performance depends on the
choice of parameters k and ǫ. Experiments indicate that if
parameter k is large enough (k = 105) and parameter ǫ is set
reasonably (in the experimental evaluation we use ǫ = 0.4,
see Section III-B for details), the results are comparable
with clustering methods applied to the complete data. The
computational complexity of this sequential approximation
is O (l · (k · (k − 1) /2 + cl ·m · (nl − k))) where l is the
number of iterations of algorithm (typically l ≤ 10), nl is
the number of non-clustered samples in l-th iteration, k is the
number of randomly selected samples, cl is the number of
cluster prototypes produced by the clustering algorithm in l-
th iteration and m is the maximal size of a cluster prototype
(typicallym = 10). Since the parameter k is fixed and k ≪ n,
we can see that the number of evaluations of the similarity
function is linear in the number of samples, which clearly
outperforms the quadratic complexity required by the vanilla
Louvain method.
III. EVALUATION
In this section the proposed approach is compared to the
approach proposed by Rieck, et al. [38] (further referred to
as Rieck) and the approach proposed by Mohaisen, et al.
[30] (further referred to as AMAL). Rieck has been selected
as a representative of the prior art that encodes malware
behavior into a high-dimensional feature space using bag-of-
words model built directly from data; it uses kernelized SVM
to classify binaries. The second approach, AMAL, encodes
malware behavior using a relatively low number of hand-
made features; to classify unknown binaries AMAL trains
multiple classifiers (SVM, decision trees, k-nearest neighbor,
etc.) and selects the optimal classifier for given data using
cross-validation.
A. Data set description
The dataset used for experiments contained 250 527 files
collected from October 24, 2016 to December 12, 2016
using AMP ThreatGrid [18]. All files were also analyzed by
VirusTotal.com service [19] and labeled using its verdicts as
follows: a file was labeled as malicious if at least 4 out of
10 selected AV engines (see Table IV for details) detected
the file as malicious, and it was labeled as legitimate if none
of the AV engines detected the file. Remaining files were
discarded as unknown and removed from both training and
testing sets in order to limit the effect of misclassifications
by individual AV engines. The final numbers of files were:
144 229 malicious, 87 026 legitimate, and 19 272 discarded
as unknown. The numbers of samples of individual malware
families are summarized in Table III.
All files were executed in sandbox by AMP ThreatGrid [18]
service, using Windows 7 64bit (71% samples) environment,
as it is the most popular OS at the time of writing4, and Win-
dows XP (29% samples) environment, since it is still widely
deployed on embedded machines such as ATMs. Virtual
machines were connected to the Internet without any filtering
or restrictions that could by any mean prevent connections to
4According to http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_os.asp Win-
dows 7 has 34.6% market share against 1.0% covered by Windows XP, 11.1%
covered by Windows 8 and 30.9% covered by Windows 10.
6Malware family #samples Malware family #samples
nemucod 13 781 amonetize 1172
cerber 12 829 nanocore 1032
bladabindi 10 945 loadmoney 964
locky 9894 yakes 892
gamarue 7694 bifrose 804
darkkomet 4664 autoit 781
hupigon 3555 kolabc 707
upatre 3269 waldek 686
tinba 3104 pdfka 649
scar 2961 shipup 625
swrort 2868 rebhip 613
zbot 2426 razy 599
virlock 1797 agentb 579
fareit 1763 poison 551
farfli 1749 xtrat 511
zegost 1719 onlinegames 502
virut 1556 ramnit 493
adwind 1537 magania 463
zusy 1505 atraps 461
ircbot 1447 softpulse 460
zerber 1329 banload 387
palevo 1270 ruskill 374
vobfus 1244 downloadassistant 373
delf 1228 binder 350
donoff 1211 remaining MW families 31 856
Total malicious 144 229
Total legitimate 87 026
Table III: Number of samples of malware families in the
data set. The malware families for individual samples were
determined using AVClass tool [40].
AhnLab, V3 Internet Security G Data, InternetSecurity
Avira, Antivirus Pro Kaspersky Lab, Internet Security
Bitdefender, Internet Security Microworld, eScan internet security suite
ESET, Internet Security Symantec, Norton Security
F-Secure, Safe Trend Micro, Internet Security
Table IV: Selected AV engines that received full 6 points for
performance in AV-Test report from December 2016 [4].
command & control servers or other servers. The work here
is not tailored to AMP ThreatGrid, as the same or similar
information about binaries can be obtained by a number of
different sandboxing solutions such as Cuckoo [35], Ether
[12], or CWSandbox [44].
In contrast to the majority of prior art, binaries were divided
into training and testing sets according to the dates they were
collected rather than randomly. This approach is more realistic
since it does not overestimate the detection performance as
some malware families may not be known at the time of
training, as they might have appeared later. Thus, all train-
ing samples collected prior to November 12, 2016 (72 963
malicious binaries and 48 152 legitimate binaries) were used
for training, and remaining samples (71 266 malicious binaries
and 38 874 legitimate binaries) were used for testing.
B. Hyper-parameter optimization
All compared methods have several parameters that have to
be tuned to achieve good detection accuracy. While in Rieck
and the proposed method the parameters have to be optimized
using grid search (detailed below), AMAL is designed to
perform such optimization during training in order to select
both the optimal classifier (SVM, linear SVM, decision trees,
logistic regression, k-nearest neighbor and perceptron) and its
parameters and thus it does not need to optimize its parameters
in advance.
Since Rieck uses SVM with L2 regularization and polyno-
mial kernel there are two parameters that need to be tuned:
misclassification cost C ∈
{
10−2, . . . , 108
}
and degree of the
kernel d ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. The optimal configuration achieving
highest accuracy estimated by five-fold cross-validation on the
training data was C = 104, d = 4.
The random forest classifier described in Section II
contains several parameters such as the number of trees
K ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 200}, maximal depth dm ∈
{5, 10, 30, 50,∞}, minimal number of samples in node to
perform split sn ∈ {2, 4, 6, 10, 20}, and criterion c ∈
{gini, entropy}. All remaining parameters (maximal number
of features, minimal number of samples in leaf, maximal
number of leafs, class weights, minimum weighted fraction
of the total sum of weights in leaf, minimal impurity for split)
were set to their default values as defined in the Scikit-learn
library [36] since according to our experiments they have little
influence on detection performance. The optimal configuration
of parameters with respect to accuracy estimated by five-fold
cross-validation on training data was K = 100, dm = ∞,
sn = 2 and c = gini.
Additional two parameters (size of randomly selected sub-
sets k ∈
{
104, 2 · 104, 5 · 104, 105, 2 · 105, 5 · 105,∞
}
and
minimal similarity ǫ ∈ {0.1, . . . , 0.9}) affect the clustering
of the resource names described in Section II-E. The minimal
similarity was optimized on a manually labeled set of file paths
and registry keys that were clustered with different values of
ǫ. The resulting clusters were evaluated with respect to the
adjusted rand index [37], a well known score for evaluation
of clustering algorithms, and the optimal value of ǫ = 0.4 was
selected. To find the optimal size of randomly selected subsets
k the accuracy of the whole proposed method with different
settings of parameter k was estimated using five fold cross
validation on randomly selected subset of training data5. Since
the differences between various settings were negligible, the
value of the parameter k = 105 was selected as a reasonable
balance. Low value of parameter k increases the number of
iterations l performed by the clustering algorithm, since too
many samples are rejected to be too dissimilar to available
cluster prototypes, and high value increases the quadratic cost
for computation of adjacency matrix required by Louvain
method.
Classification performance was measured with standard
evaluation metrics [14]: true positive rate (TPR), false neg-
ative rate (FNR), true negative rate (TNR), false positive
rate (FPR) and accuracy. Since the experimental scenario
is binary (positive malware vs. negative benign), the TPR
(FNR) is the proportion of correctly (incorrectly) classified
malware samples, TNR (FPR) is the proportion of correctly
(incorrectly) classified legitimate samples and accuracy is the
rate of correctly classified samples regardless their class.
5The subset was limited to ~30 000 samples in order to limit the number
of resources so that complete clustering could be performed.
7estimated on testing set estimated on training set
TPR FPR ACC TPR FPR ACC
This paper 0.954 0.067 0.943 0.973 0.061 0.956
Rieck 0.934 0.081 0.926 0.974 0.014 0.980
AMAL 0.795 0.108 0.845 0.845 0.047 0.899
Table V: True (TPR) and false (FPR) positive rates of evalu-
ated methods estimated on the training and testing set.
C. Experimental results
The comparison and evaluation is divided into two parts.
The first experiment evaluates the detection performance of
the proposed method, Rieck and AMAL trained on the full
training set (121 115 samples), while the second experiment
measures degradation of detection performance when only a
limited number of data are available for training (5%, 10%,
20% and 100% of training samples). Note that to evaluate
AMAL on the complete training set, the meta learner was not
allowed to use SVM classifier with RBF kernel due to ex-
cessive computational requirements. Note that AMAL’s meta-
learner has never selected this variant of the SVM classifier in
smaller experiments performed in this work, hence removing
it most probably does not have any impact on the results.
The detection rates and accuracy of classifiers trained on
all 121 115 training samples as estimated on testing samples
are shown in Table V. The differences between evaluation
metrics indicate that the proposed approach outperforms both
Rieck and AMAL having the lowest false positive rate and
false negative rate. A deeper analysis of the misclassifications
produced by the proposed approach revealed that most of the
false positives (legitimate binaries classified as malware) were
software utilities such as TeamViewer that install themselves
into system directories without any user interaction. Since their
incidence in the training set was relatively low, the random
forest was not able to precisely learn this type of behavior. A
second source of errors are false negatives (malware samples
classified as benign) where almost 70% are caused by insuf-
ficient numbers of training samples (less than 100 samples)
from corresponding malware families. Another 11% of false
negatives was caused by concept drift as a portion of testing
samples exhibited different behaviors than training samples,
i.e. created files or registry keys followed different pattern,
network communication significantly different URLs, etc.
Large gaps between training and testing accuracies for
AMAL and Rieck suggest that manually created features and
BoW features do not generalize over longer periods of time as
well as features created through clustering do. This suggests
that clustering removes some randomization of resource names
while retaining a large part of information content.
Figures 1a and 1b show graphs of FNR and FPR rates for
larger sizes of the training set expressed as fraction of the
data available for training. For fair comparison the testing
set was kept static containing all 110 140 samples collected
after November 12, 2016. Both graphs show that the proposed
approach is able to achieve lower FNR and FPR using fewer
samples. In fact, the proposed approach achieved FNR of
0.052 using just 5% of samples, while Rieck achieved 0.066
using the full training set. Similarly, the proposed approach
needed just 20% of samples to achieve the same FPR 0.081
as Rieck on all samples.
Figures 1a and 1b also shows that while false negative
rates almost do not change with respect to the size of the
training set (especially for the proposed approach), the false
positive rates decrease dramatically. This suggests that learning
behavior of legitimate applications is more difficult than that of
malware, which can be caused by the fact that the behavior of
malware is more uniform than that of legitimate applications.
This corroborates the motivation of this work, that even though
malware authors try to randomize, they tend to randomize with
same sort of regularity, which leads to uniformity.
D. Detection limits
The experimental results hint at where are the limits of
classifying binaries executed in sandbox. When a binary (or all
binaries of some malware family) does not perform any actions
changing the data used by the proposed or other methods (files,
mutexes, network communication, registry keys) it clearly
evades detection. An example of such malware is bitcoin
miner that resides only in memory without any additional
footprint (no operations with files, no operations with registry
keys, no mutexes, very limited network communication). Such
malware has to be carefully crafted to avoid any interaction
with system resources (statically compiled to carry all libraries
in the executable, limited network communication, no mutexes
ensuring that only single instance is running on the same
machine, no persistency after reboot, etc.). Fortunately, at the
time of writing this work, this is not an easy task and the
majority of malware authors choose to interact with system
resources rather than sacrifice functionality.
Another limitation is the fact that a growing number of mal-
ware families are equipped with advanced anti-VM and anti-
sandbox features and/or are targeted to specific environments
(Stuxnet [13]). Such malware families do not reveal their
true purpose during sandboxing or mimic less severe types
of malware (adware, PUA6, etc.). This fact is recognized by
the community as the main factor hindering the performance
of dynamic analysis as the whole. Addressing this issue is out
of the scope of this paper.
The last aspect we need to discuss is the false positive rate.
The analysis of the results from Section III revealed that a large
number of false alarms is caused by applications that install
themselves into system directories without user’s interaction
and since their number is limited, the classifier was unable to
fit this behavior. A solution is of course to improve the training
data by including a larger number of such samples and thus
achieve lower false positive rate.
E. Scalability and computational complexity
The last aspect we will discuss is the scalability of the
proposed solution and prior art. Since the proposed solution
employs clustering to project the input data into a feature space
with a lower dimension, a large portion of the training time
6Potentially unwanted application.
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Figure 1: Comparison of FNR and FPR for Rieck and proposed method trained on training sets of different sizes (5%, 10%,
20% and 100% of training samples).
is spent in the clustering phase. However, the preprocessing
of the dataset used in above experiments was much faster
(∼ 2h50min) than the highly optimized pre-computation of
the full kernel matrix required by Rieck (∼ 7h). This is caused
by the fact that the time required by Rieck for preprocessing
grows quadratically with the number of training samples in
contrast to the proposed solution with linear complexity (up to
an additive constant, see Section II-E). Moreover, the proposed
solution can be easily distributed since in every iteration the
nearest neighbor search depends only on a limited set of
current cluster prototypes C′.
Another benefit of the proposed solution is tied to the
representation itself. Since the clustering is performed only
on training samples, in order to classify unknown samples
we need to store only the cluster prototypes determined
during training. For the whole training dataset used in this
paper, which contains over 7 million unique resource names
projected into ∼ 40 000 features, only 400 000 instances need
to be stored. In contrast, the kernelized SVM classifier used
by Rieck et al. requires to store all training samples (over
120 000 samples in the data discussed in Section III) with all
actions (on average 2000 actions per sample) in order to make
prediction on unknown samples.
In contrast to both the proposed solution and Rieck, AMAL
does not need any preprocessing since the features can be
extracted per sample. However, the complexity arises from
the design of the training process. Authors in [30] argue
that the dynamic selection of both optimal algorithm and its
parameters provides optimal results, but this design makes
the training process computationally expensive since every
training of the meta-learner requires to evaluate all possible
combinations of parameters for all its classifiers. Another
aspect is the selection of classifiers itself. Authors propose
to use an array of classifiers such as kernelized SVM, linear
regression, decision trees, perceptron, etc. However, the com-
plexity of some classifiers (e.g. kernelized SVM) prevents any
large-scale training. Moreover, according to the evaluation the
AMAL’s detection capabilities are not sufficient for real-world
deployment since both FPR and FNR are nearly 20%, which
is clearly insufficient.
IV. RELATED WORK
Since the analysis of malicious binaries and recommending
them for further analysis has important practical applications,
there exists rich prior art. Although it is frequently divided into
two categories, static and dynamic, the boundaries between
them are blurred since techniques such as analysis of the
execution graph is used in both categories.
A. Static malware analysis
Static malware analysis treats a malware binary file as a
data file from which it extracts features without executing it.
The earliest approaches [27] looked for a manually specified
set of specific instructions (tell-tale) used by malware to
perform malicious actions but not used by legitimate binaries.
Latter works, inspired by text analysis, used n-gram models of
binaries and instructions within [26]. Malware authors reacted
quickly and began to obfuscate, encrypt, and randomize their
binaries, which rendered such basic models [41] useless. Since
reversing obfuscation and polymorphic techniques is in theory
an NP-hard problem [31], most state of the art [9], [1], [42]
moved to a higher-level modeling of sequences of instructions
/ system calls and estimating their action or effect on the
operating system. The rationale behind is that higher-level
actions are more difficult to hide.
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An alternative solution to analyzing obfuscation and encryp-
tion is the execution of a binary in a controlled environment
and analyzing its interactions with the operating system and
system resources.
A large portion of the work related to dynamic malware
analysis utilize system calls, since in modern operating sys-
tems system calls are the only way for applications to interact
with the hardware and as such they can reveal malware actions.
The simplest methods view a sequence of system calls as a
sequence of strings and use histograms of occurrences to create
feature vectors for the classifier of choice [17]. The biggest
drawback of these naive techniques is low robustness to system
call randomization. Similarly to static analysis, this problem
can be tackled by assigning actions to groups (clusters) of
system calls (syscalls) and using them to characterize the
binary [32], [45], [5].
A wide class of methods identifying malware binaries from
sequences of syscalls rely on n-grams [24], [34]. Malheur [39]
uses normalized histograms of n-grams as feature vectors,
which effectively embeds syscall sequences into Euclidean
space endowed with L2 norm. In this space the algorithm
extracts prototypes Z = {z1, . . . , zn} using hierarchical clus-
tering. Each prototype captures the behavior of the cluster,
which should match corresponding malware family. An inter-
esting feature of Malheur is that if a cluster has less then a
certain number of samples, the prototype is not created. The
classification of an unknown binary is determined by searching
for the nearest prototype within certain range. If the nearest
prototype is outside of this range, the sample is not classified.
To counter dynamic analysis advanced malware detects the
presence of a sandbox and does not execute within it. Since
most sandboxes rely on a detectable system call interposition,
Das et al. [11] propose to extend hardware with FPGA that
would extract system calls from their execution on proces-
sor. Syscalls are then grouped by comprehensive yet hand
designed rules, and these groups are then fed into multi-layer
neural network classifier. The classifier itself is also part of
the FPGA, such that the system can simultaneously extract
training samples and classify them.
AMAL uses its custom sandbox to extract features describ-
ing files, network communication and registry features [30]
and tunes various classification algorithms. The main dif-
ference between AMAL and this work is the construction
of features. Whereas AMAL uses numeric features such as
counts or sizes of created, modified or deleted files, counts of
created, modified or deleted registry keys, counts of unique
IP addresses, etc., we assume that individual resources (files,
registry keys, mutexes and network communication) have
specific role in the operation system, which can be different
even though the characteristics exhibited by the file are the
same.
The approach proposed by Rieck et al. [38] creates a
representation of the analyzed binaries directly from the data
which is at the first sight similar to the proposed approach,
however there are two key differences. The first one is the
source of data, because Rieck et al. model actions triggered by
the malware (writing into a file, communication with remote
server, reading data from registry keys, starting new thread,
etc.), whereas the proposed approach models only affected
resources. This enables to deploy the proposed approach in
environments without access to low-level actions (VMs with-
out such access, user machines without API hooking). Another
difference is in handling the randomization of resource names.
Instead of clustering resource names used in this work, Rieck
et al. remove parameters of actions, which increases the
dimensionality of the model since for every action with n
parameters it creates n+ 1 features representing the action at
different levels of granularity by removing parameters from
the end: from full description with all parameters to the most
coarse description where only name of the action is used. This
leads to a massive increase in the already large number of
features.7 Even though the resulting feature space, is sparse
the scalability of such an approach is limited.
V. CONCLUSION
Dynamic malware analysis is a popular approach to auto-
matically identify malware binaries and analyze them. This
paper has proposed a model of malware behavior observed
through its interactions with the operating system and net-
work resources (operations with files, mutexes, registry keys,
operations with network servers or error messages provided
by the operating system). It employs an efficient clustering
of resource names to reduce the impact of randomization
commonly employed by malware authors to avoid detection
and projects malware samples into a low-dimensional space
suitable for classifiers such as random forest.
The proposed solution was extensively compared to related
state of the art on a large corpus of binaries where it demon-
strated significant increase in precision of malware detection.
Moreover, we believe that the availability of solutions relying
on widely different types of features increases the overall
reliability of malware detection techniques, because malware
authors have to evade more detectors to stay undetected.
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APPENDIX
A. Frobenius product and Frobenius norm
For two matrices A ∈ Rn×m and B ∈ Rn×m we define
Frobenius product 〈·, ·〉F and Frobenius norm ‖·‖F as follows
〈A,B〉F =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Aij · Bij
‖A‖F =
√
〈A,A〉F =
√√√√
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
A2ij
